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Many cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of science consider it uncontroversial that the brain 
processes information.  In this work we broadly consider the types of experimental evidence that would support 
this claim, and find that although physical features of specific brain areas selectively covary with external 
stimuli or abilities, there is no direct evidence supporting an information processing function of any particular 






     Many cognitive scientists believe that the brain processes 
information.  Bechtel and Richardson (2010), as philosophers of 
cognitive science, consider it uncontroversial that cognitive 
scientists involved in neuroimaging research believe that “the 
brain contains some regions that are specialized for processing 
specific types of information (p241).”  Neuroscientists too claim 
that “the principle function of the central nervous system is to 
represent and transform information (deCharms and Zador 2000, 
p613).” Given such wide-spread acceptance of a belief, it is 
appropriate to ask for the justification of this belief.  If the 
justification is empirical and experimental, then we should look 
to the research reported by working scientists in the field; if it is 
metaphysical, then we should look to the arguments of 
philosophers and theoreticians. 
     We will no doubt discover both kinds of justification if we 
look for it.  Yet we assume that cognitive scientists, when stating 
that the brain processes information, are primarily stating an 
empirical fact or a widely agreed-upon scientific proposition that 
is supported by a body of experimental evidence.  Like the 
physicist who can back up the proposition “protons have spin” 
with a presentation of the experimental evidence, we expect that 
the cognitive scientist should be able to do the same regarding a 
statement about the brain.  If the cognitive scientist cannot do 
this, then the proposition is non-empirical or unscientific.  We 
are not suggesting a definition of science or solving Popper’s 
demarcation problem, but we are appealing to the belief that 
accepted scientific statements are associated with experimental 
evidence.  Without associated evidence, a proposition cannot be 
scientific. 
     Our task here, however, is somewhat more involved than an 
objective review of the scientific literature.  As we have learned 
from philosophers of science over the past century, “theory 
dominates the experimental work from its initial planning up to 
the finishing touches in the laboratory (Popper 1959, p90).”  
Hanson (1958) and Kuhn (1962) were among the first to direct 
our attention to the theory-ladenness of scientific observation.  
Brewster (2001) extended this position, arguing that the complete 
scientific process, which includes attention, perception, data 
interpretation, memory, and scientific communication, is 
influenced by theory.  Perhaps most relevant to our work is 
Popper’s warning that “…observation statements and statements 
of experimental results, are always interpretations of the facts 
observed…they are interpretations in the light of theories (italics 
in original, p. 90).”  Of course, none of this need imply scientific 
relativism, and relativism is not assumed in this work. 
     One may presume that only cognitive scientists are qualified 
to interpret the experimental evidence in the field.  While an 
expert’s assessment carries more weight than the non-involved 
observer, it is reasonable that anyone who takes time to 
understand the evidence and its methods of acquisition is in a 
position to construct an interpretation.  The force of the 
interpretation should be based upon the reason of the argument 
and not only its source.  Nonetheless, we have performed some 
of the types of experiments that we are now interpreting. 
     Cognitive scientific evidence, especially neuroimaging 
evidence, has been increasingly subjected to criticisms.  To better 
demarcate our position, we highlight that we are not specifically 
arguing between distributed versus localized processing in the 
brain (Utel 2001, Hardcastle and Stewart 2002), and we are not 
pointing out the previously discussed technical-methodological 
limitations of brain assessing technologies (Logothetis 2008, 
Roskies 2007, Klein 2009).  We do share with these authors the 
broader concern for interpretations of evidence in the field of 
cognitive science, and how theoretical assumptions influence 
interpretations of evidence, ultimately ending in statements made 
by cognitive scientists that carry the weight of scientific fact.  
These facts, in turn, are used by naturalistic philosophers of mind 
to constrain philosophical theory and argument.  
 
2. COGNITIVE SCIENCE EVIDENCE TYPES 
 
     The scientific statement that we will consider is Bechtel and 
Richardson’s proposition “the brain contains some regions that 
are specialized for processing specific types of information,” 
although, since we are not specifically arguing against 
localization of brain function, we will consider simultaneously 
the more general proposition P “the brain processes 
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information.”  deCharms and Zador say that it is the function of 
the brain to process (represent and transform) information.  There 
is no philosophical consensus on how to define a natural 
biological function, and we will assume that processing 
information is a natural function of the brain like pumping blood 
is a natural function of the heart.  One might argue that 
processing information is a natural process and not a natural 
function, and we will consider both alternatives, at times blurring 
the distinction in this work. 
     We wish to consider the experimental evidence that justifies 
P.  There are tens of thousands of papers in scientific journals 
that may be used as evidence, thus a systematic evaluation of 
every paper independently and subsequent integration of the 
evidence is not feasible.   The task must be simplified, but in a 
way that addresses the initial question.  As a first step, we will 
only consider research that involves measuring or manipulating 
the physical properties of brain.  While a study that does not 
involve brain properties may contribute to our scientific 
understanding of the brain, it can only do so indirectly by 
prompting theory formation and characterizing behavioral 
phenomena.  For example, in 1908 Yerkes and Dodson 
discovered that performance on a task at first increases with 
increasing arousal and then decreases once arousal levels become 
too great.  They quantified the intuition that ‘stress’ can enhance 
performance.  This interesting and useful finding may suggest 
neurophysiological correlates of performance and arousal, but it 
does not experimentally justify any statement about brain 
function in a direct sense. 
     We are primarily interested with research that investigates the 
relations between physical brain properties and behaviors, 
abilities, or physical (sensory) contexts.  Cognitive scientists, and 
philosophers of science, reference the evidence from this 
category of research when making claims about brain function.  
Relational evidence, as we will call it, can be broken down into 
four major categories: 
   1)  structure/ability studies,  
   2)  external-stimulus/brain-response studies,  
   3)  task/brain-response studies, and  
   4)  brain-manipulation/behavioral-response studies.   
     In structure/ability (or S/A) studies, researchers relate the 
structure or structural states of the brain to the absence or 
presence of particular behaviors or abilities.  Paul Broca (1861) 
popularized this type of research with his lesion-deficit, or lesion 
study, when he discovered an individual who could only speak 
the syllable ‘tan.’  A post-mortem analysis of the person’s brain 
revealed damaged brain tissue in the posterior part of the left 
inferior frontal gyrus—a region now known as Broca’s area. 
Thus Broca related the ability to produce fluent speech to the left 
inferior frontal gyrus.  The class of S/A studies includes more 
than lesion studies since any physical feature of the brain (e.g. 
patterns of white matter connectivity) may be associated with the 
absence or presence of specific abilities. 
     The structure in S/A studies refers to the physical structure of 
the brain as measured by a variety of measuring techniques, the 
most basic being gross anatomical observation of brain tissue.   
Other measuring techniques include, but are not limited to, 
histological examination, molecular analysis, electroencephalo-
graphy (EEG), magnetoencephalogray (MEG), computed 
tomography (CT), positron emissions tomography (PET), single 
photon emitted computed tomography (SPECT), structural 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), diffusion tensor imaging 
(DTI),  magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS), and others.  By 
ability we mean any observable behavior that can be done by an 
animal or human, such as the ability to count out loud, to raise 
one’s arm, to navigate a maze, to write a sentence, to score above 
chance on a test, etc. 
     In external-stimulus/brain-response (ES/BR) studies, the 
experimenter systematically manipulates a physical feature of an 
organism’s external environment, and measures temporally 
coincident properties of the organism’s brain.  The response need 
not occur precisely simultaneous with the stimulus and is 
typically extended in time.  Edgar Adrian is generally credited 
with pioneering stimulus-response studies of nervous tissue.  He 
was the first to record the electrical activity of single nerve 
fibers, and was subsequently awarded a Nobel Prize in 1932 for 
his work.  As an example of his prolific research, he isolated an 
eel’s eye and optic nerve, attached electrodes to the nerve, and 
recorded the electrical activity to varying lighting situations 
(Adrian and Matthews 1927). 
     Brain responses in ES/BR studies are recorded using a variety 
of techniques based upon electromagnetic brain properties, 
including single-unit intra and extracellular recording, evoked 
potentials, EEG, MEG, and others.  Functional MRI (fMRI) is a 
popular tool used by cognitive scientists to assess brain 
properties in response to an ES.  Proper interpretation of the 
fMRI signal itself requires technical background knowledge 
(Roskies 2007, Logothetis 2008); briefly, the fMRI signal is 
consequence of the magnetic properties of blood components 
which covary with local metabolic demands.   Other common 
techniques in ES/BR studies include PET and optical imaging.   
     When, within a research protocol, a brain-response is 
recorded while the organism is performing a particular task or 
activity, we call this a task/brain-response (T/BR) study.  The 
form of the T/BR study is similar to ES/BR studies, except the 
process of completing the task is ‘self-directed’ rather than under 
complete control of the experimenter.   Often T/BR studies 
include ES aspects as well.  Memory research provides typical 
examples.  Poppenk et al. (2010), in studying prospective 
memory which is described as the ability to act out postponed 
intentions at future times, presented a series of visual scenes (ES) 
to subjects and instructed the subjects to either imagine 
performing an action associated with the visual scene, or to use 
the scene as a reminder to perform an action the next time the 
same scene was viewed.  FMRI was used to measure properties 
of the subjects’ brains during the tasks.  Notice that although the 
experimenter controls the ES and the task command directly, she 
cannot control the process by which the subject completes the 
task. 
     Brain-manipulation/behavioral response (BM/BR) studies 
differ from ES/BR and T/BR studies in that physical properties 
of the brain are directly controlled or manipulated while a 
behavioral response is observed.  Technologies used for BM 
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include lesioning, gene-expression, direct current stimulation, 
electrode-based deep brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, and light-based optogenetic stimulation, among 
others.  Optogenetic studies are a relatively recent advance.  
They are based upon the introduction of light-activated channels 
into specific populations of neurons, permitting relatively precise 
control of action potential generation in live organisms (Zhang et 
al. 2007).  For example,  Wyart et al. (2009) expressed light 
sensitive genes within so-called Kolmer-Agdur cells of the 
zebrafish, and then non-invasively manipulated the neuronal 
activity of these cells which modulated the swimming behavior 
of the animal. 
 
3. INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
    We wish to determine if research studies from the categories 
of relational evidence discussed thus far justify the scientific 
claim P that the brain processes information.  Again, we will not 
consider every study; rather, we will start with a typical example 
from each category of evidence and attempt to generalize our 
conclusions to the category.   
 
3.1  S/A 
 
    Beginning with Broca, what can we infer from his S/A study 
of subject ‘Tan’ who could only speak the syllable ‘tan’, and 
more specifically, how do we clarify the relationship between 
brain structure and the inability to produce fluent, complex 
speech (Broca’s aphasia)?  It is clear that Broca’s area lesions 
and Broca’s aphasia are related in the sense that they can occur 
contemporaneously within a single individual.  It is also clear 
that Broca’s lesion and Broca’s aphasia need not be 
contemporaneous, for 85% of patients with chronic Broca’s 
aphasia have lesions in Broca’s area, and only 50-60% of 
patients with lesions in Broca’s area have a persisting Broca’s 
aphasia.  Further, surgical excision of Broca’s area—a brain 
manipulation/behavioral response study—has led only to 
transient mutism followed by recovery of the patient to normal 
(Dronkers 2000).  This evidence alone is enough to at least 
challenge claims of understanding the function of Broca’s area.  
One can of course speculate on the functioning of a brain area 
given an imperfect statistical correlation between that brain area 
and an observed ability, but any claims of knowledge of function 
are excessive: we have knowledge of the correlation and not the 
function. 
     Let us assume, falsely, that Broca’s lesions and Broca’s 
aphasia were perfectly correlated in the sense that 100% of 
patients with Broca’s aphasia have lesions and 100% of patients 
with lesions have aphasia, for it is possible that other S/A studies 
exhibit perfect correlation.  From this finding, can we conclude 
that perfect correlation between structural brain states and 
particular abilities justifies P?  This would at first appear to 
depend upon the nature of the ability being studied, but it is not 
clear that any S/A study could empirically justify that the brain 
processes information.  In S/A studies, one may try to infer brain 
processes given a correlated ability.  There is a tendency to argue 
that the structural brain area that is correlated with an ability is in 
fact performing a process proximately responsible for the ability, 
but this is not the logic of S/A studies.  The logic of S/A studies 
is as follows: if a subject with structural pattern S cannot do A, 
but a subject without S can do A, then the ability to perform A 
must depend upon S in some way.  Even if we accept this logic—
which requires that the subjects are similar in every other way 
except S—we cannot logically infer that the function of S is to 
perform A.  
     It should be clear that attributing function based upon S/A 
studies is not logically justified.  Consider this example.  There 
were many times when my computer, the computer I am using 
right now, loses a particular ability that I expect it to have.  I 
recall a time when I was unable to run programs I typically run, 
and other programs began running very slowly or would shut 
down for no apparent reason in mid-session.  The problem turned 
out to be a dead CPU fan.  Should we say that the function of the 
CPU fan is to run programs quickly and prevent them from 
shutting down?  The abilities in question depended upon the 
spinning of the fan, but the fan does not perform the absent 
abilities—the function of the fan is to cool down the CPU.  The 
CPU fan participates in a series of causal interactions that run 
programs when ‘everything is working,’ and we could similarly 
argue, given the results of a S/A study, that a structural feature of 
the brain participates in causal interactions that realize a 
particular ability under certain conditions.  This does not entail, 
given a S/A study, that the function of the brain structure is to 
perform the ability in question. 
     How do we relate the structure of a brain area to the function 
of that area?  In S/A studies, that function is always speculatively 
inferred from an observed ability.  We do not study how the 
dynamic processes of the brain area and its relations to the rest of 
the organism causally make the ability possible—but this is what 
we need to understand if we are to assign a function (or process) 
to the brain area in question.   Broca’s area is more selectively 
related to the ability to produce grammatically appropriate 
speech than some other parts of the organism.  One may argue 
that the imperfect but selective correlation between Broca’s area 
and Broca’s aphasia justifies the scientific claim that Broca’s 
area processes linguistic information, but the ability ‘to process 
linguistic information’ plays no obvious role in the study.   To 
justify the claim that Broca’s area processes linguistic 
information given the evidence of a related S/A study—a claim 
made but many scientists in the field—we would have to assume 
that speaking grammatically appropriate speech involves 
linguistic information processing by the organism as a whole 
(because this is the only way that processes and operations enter 
into S/A studies.  We do not observe brain area processes; we 
observe the functioning organism), and then further identify the 
ability to process linguistic information with the function of 
Broca’s area.  But neither of these steps is empirically justified.  
No one directly measures linguistic information processing in the 
study—we simply observe the form of speech—and the 
identification of an organism’s ability with the functioning of a 
brain area is a speculative inference.  This does not imply that 
Broca’s area plays no role in the ability to produce fluent 
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speech—we simply do not know what that role is given limited 
evidence and theory. 
     We will not address other S/A studies as the form of our 
argument applies to all studies that attempt to relate brain 
structures and organism abilities.  In summary, the evidence in 
S/A studies is composed of correlations between brain structures 
and organism-level abilities.  To arrive at claims of information 
processing in the brain from S/A studies, one must first infer that 
the brain structure performs a process or function that directly 
enacts the organism-level ability in question, but this inference is 
speculative.  In a second layer of interpretation, one must identify 
performing the process or function with information processing, 
but this identification enters as an assumption independent of the 
evidence. 
 
3.2  ES/BR 
 
     External-stimulus/brain-response studies address questions of 
brain function more directly than S/A studies and are probably 
the largest category of relational evidence.   Edgar Adrian, in his 
pioneering ES/BR research, measured the electrical responses of 
single sensory cells, such as stretch receptors, while they were 
fixed to particular weights.  He observed that a cell’s electrical 
responses are in the form of stereotyped action potentials, or 
spikes, and that the rate of producing spikes increases as the 
weight increases.  Thus the rate, or frequency, of spikes during a 
fixed time period is able to predict the magnitude of the stimulus. 
     These early experiments established that single cell responses 
and stimulus magnitudes may reliably covary with each other.  
While magnitudes and intensities are important properties of 
stimuli, they are not the only properties of environmental stimuli 
that are relevant to an organism.  In general, a stimulus may be 
characterized by multiple properties.  For example, an auditory 
stimulus may be described by its intensity, frequency spectrum, 
temporal envelope, source direction, source distance, and so on.  
It is possible that a particular cell responds to one of these 
properties and not the others, or to some combination of 
properties, which suggests that a cell may be selective for 
specific properties or features of the stimulus. 
     Barlow (1953) was perhaps the first to clearly demonstrate the 
feature selectivity of sensory cells (Reike et. al 1999).  By 
recording the electrical activity of retinal ganglion cells in the 
frog, he was able to show that the cell’s activity covaries with the 
location and size of a circular spot light on the retina.  After 
systematically varying the light spot’s size and location, Barlow 
determined that the cell’s receptive field—the collection of 
stimulus properties that maximally activated the cell—is a 
circularly symmetric form called a center-surround field.  Spots 
of light within a small region of the retina activate the cell, but 
spots of light away from that region inhibit it.   
      Hubel and Wiesel (1962) greatly extended Barlow’s work 
and discovered cells of the striate (visual) cortex that have 
surprisingly complicated receptive fields.  Two of these cell 
types are the so-called simple and complex cells, which respond 
maximally to appropriately oriented bars or slits of light.  Some 
of the cells are relatively insensitive to the location of the bar, 
while others only appreciably respond to moving bars.  In 
describing these cells, Hubel says that “We feel that we have at 
least some understanding of a cell if we can say that its duty is to 
take care of a 1 degree by 1 degree region of retina, 6 degrees to 
the left of the fovea and 4 degrees above it, and to fire whenever 
a light line on a dark background appears, provided it is inclined 
at about 45 degrees (Hubel 1962, p168).”  
     The evidence from all of these pioneering ES/BR electro-
physiological studies cannot be interpreted without the concept 
of selective response.   Selective response means, loosely, that 
the cell fires action potentials only when the ‘right’ stimulus is 
present.   Put more rigorously, selective response refers to two 
characteristics of neuronal cells: (1) the rate or pattern of firing 
action potentials (the spike train) covaries with specific stimulus 
properties, and (2) different cells may respond differently to the 
same stimulus.  Both characteristics are typically implied when 
referring to the selectivity of cells in ES/BR studies.  If someone 
discovered a neuron that exhibited (1), but on subsequent 
research discovered that all neurons exhibited (1) in the same 
way, one would not say that the initial neuron was selective for 
the stimulus, even though it exhibited selectivity for some stimuli 
among others.  As well, the fact that different neurons respond 
differently to similar stimuli does not imply (1), since neuronal 
responses may be random in response to stimuli.  Condition (1) is 
a form of within neuron stimulus selectivity, while condition (2) 
is a form of between neuron stimulus selectivity. For ES/BR 
studies such as Hubel and Wiesel’s, when an ES is chosen and 
controlled by the researcher,  we assume that the relation 
between the ES and BR is causal, as this assumption does not 
change our interpretation of selectively, even though we use the 
term ‘covaries’  which has statistical connotations. 
     We are now in a position to evaluate whether Hubel and 
Wiesel’s ground-breaking ES/BR studies justify the claim that 
the brain processes information.  In this case we are asking if 
specific neurons, complex cells of the striate cortex, process or 
carry information.  The experimental evidence consists of 
recorded responses of complex cells that demonstrate stimulus 
selectivity in the senses of (1) and (2).  It seems that selectivity in 
the sense of (2) does not provide any justification that complex 
cells process information; the fact that different cells respond 
differently to the same stimulus suggests only that the cells are 
different in some way. 
     Claims of information processing, if they are justified by this 
experiment, must follow from the evidence that complex-cell 
spike trains covary with the properties of visual stimuli, or in 
causal language, that different visual stimuli cause different 
complex cell spike trains.  Considering the latter causal language, 
the fact that different causes reliably produce different effects 
when mediated by the same cell does not appear to justify the 
claim that the cell processes information, unless one takes that 
fact to be a definition of information processing itself.  Even so, 
this type of causal relationship appears everywhere one looks.  A 
particular pool ball when hit by other balls with different masses 
and velocities will undergo different effects.   The pool ball may 
not appreciably move when stimulated by light or sound at 
typical intensities.  The selectivity of the pool ball to acquire 
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different velocities in response to different causal ‘stimuli’ does 
not appear fundamentally different than the selectivity of a 
complex cell, especially if the visual stimulus is taken to be a 
space-time collection of photons. 
     On closer analysis, there is a difference between the causality 
in the pool ball example and the relation between the ES and BR 
of complex cells.   The pool ball example involves direct 
physical contact and an exchange of energy and momentum, 
while the causal response of the complex cell is more indirect.  
Photons travel through the lens of the eye and are absorbed by 
photoreceptor cells of the retina.  Absorption of photons causes 
the release of the neurotransmitter glutamate at synapses onto so-
called bipolar cells, causing the electrical field across the 
membrane of these cells to become more positive or negative, 
which respectively increases or decreases the probability of 
generating an action potential.  Bipolar cells have axons that 
synapse on other cells, and through a series of neuronal 
connections, influence the membrane potential of complex cells 
and subsequent action potential generation.  The causal chain 
from photons to complex cell response is complicated and likely 
includes causal feedback, yet it is not obvious that a complicated 
causal chain is necessarily information processing.   
      Even more worrisome is the fact that selective causation need 
not imply that the BR has any functional relation to the ES at all.  
Nothing rules out the possibility that those selective correlations 
are accidental—not in the sense that the correlations are 
statistically spurious, but that those correlations are functionally 
irrelevant to the stimuli of interest.  As an analogy, suppose my 
computer has a CPU fan with a blue LED light on the fan.  The 
light, however, is unlit and the fan isn’t spinning.  It happens that 
when I kick my computer just so on the left side of the front 
cover, the LED lights up, the fan begins spinning but stops after a 
second or two, and the light goes out.  If I kick it again, just so, it 
starts up for a second then stops.  I can reliably cause the fan to 
turn on for a bit.  When I kick the computer in other places, or 
shake it up, or sing to it, nothing happens to the fan.  The fan is 
selectively correlated with a specific kick.  Perhaps there are 
hundreds of computers, constructed at the same factory, that 
behave similarly.  This selective causal relationship does not 
imply that the fan is functionally relevant to my kicking, or 
processes kicking information, or represents kicking.   This 
causal relationship may be accidental.   Why then, given the 
evidence of selective responses in ES/BR studies, do many 
philosophers and neuroscientists associate information 
processing with this sort of causation?   
 
3.2.1 Intuition for Information in ES/BR studies 
 
      There is a strong tendency to associate information 
processing with the results of ES/BR experiments like Hubel-
Weisel’s.  The spike trains of neurons appear to be relaying 
specific messages about the external environment to the 
organism.  Claude Shannon (1948), the founder of mathematical 
communication theory, rigorously defined a model of 
information transfer that may explain this appearance.  In 
Shannon’s language, the physical environment acts as a source 
that generates a message (ES), the message is transformed by a 
transmitter—a sensory organ of the organism—into a signal 
suitable for biological transmission.  The spike train (BR) is 
assumed to be this signal and the neuron to be the transmission 
channel.   These comparisons are reasonable, but the next stage 
of the communication model, however, is problematic.   
Communication requires a receiver that performs the inverse 
operation of the transmitter, or something that reconstructs the 
environmental message from the spike train signal. 
     The experimental researcher, the one who discovers selective 
correlations between neuronal spike trains and environmental 
messages (stimuli), often plays the surrogate role of the receiver 
or decoder.  By describing relational or mathematical mappings 
between the ES and BR, neuroscientists attempt to ‘read the 
neural code.’  But this is not the sort of information transmission 
we were trying to explain.  To complete the biological 
communication model, and to ground information transfer, we 
need to explain how the organism can reconstruct the 
environmental message from its temporal pattern of action 
potentials, and we must demonstrate that the organism 
reproduces a similar environmental message within the organism 
itself.   The neuronal spike train is not the message—if anything 
it is the transmission signal or ‘encoded message.’   Although 
interesting, it is not enough to show that spike trains have the 
capacity to represent environmental messages through selective 
covariation.  The fact that researchers can mathematically map 
spike trains back onto stimuli does not say anything about how 
the organism physically reconstructs the environmental message.  
This capacity to map follows immediately from statistical 
correlations.  Neuroscientists who acknowledge these limitations 
explain that mathematically reconstructing stimuli from spike 
trains requires taking the homunculus point of view (Reike et al. 
1999). 
     For an organism to receive an environmental message, that 
message must be within the organism and have the same 
structure as the original message.  This suggestion may appear 
radical, but it is simply the completion of Shannon’s 
communication model—the same model that supports the 
intuition that the brain processes and transmits information.  For 
example, consider telephonic communication.  Air pressure 
waves may be converted into analog electronic messages that are 
encoded into digital signals and transmitted through a physical 
channel.  This digital signal, which does not mirror the sound 
wave in form, reaches a destination where it is reconstructed 
back into an analog message that drives a loudspeaker, 
reproducing the original pressure wave.  If the original message 
was not reproduced (perhaps imperfectly) at a destination, we 
could not claim that communication or information transfer took 
place.  A message is communicated if and only if that message is 
reproduced at the receiver. 
    If one assumes that the organism receives environmental 
messages, then in accordance with Shannon’s communication 
model, at least the structure of that message must be physically 
reproduced within the organism.  The alleged encoded 
message—or spike train—has a physical basis, thus the message 
ought to have a physical basis as well.  This means that the 
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scientist would have to demonstrate a set of brain-related 
physical measurements that copy, perhaps imperfectly, the 
structure of an environmental stimulus.  Let us call this the brain-
image of an environmental message.   It would remain for the 
scientist to describe the mechanisms by which neuronal spike 
trains causally reconstruct the brain-image of a particular 
environmental message. 
     But no evidence suggests that brain-images exist, so the very 
presence of an encoded message within the brain presents a 
problem.  In other words, why should the brain contain encoded 
messages that transmit environmental messages, yet never 
reproduce the structure of the message itself?   The organism 
requires the actual message, and not only an encoded version of 
it.  At this point our analogy to Shannon’s communication model 
breaks down.  It does not appear that the environment 
communicates a message to the organism, but rather, the 
organism is perhaps translating the environment.  Spike trains are 
not signals corresponding to encoded messages; they are the 
actual messages only in the language of the organism, whatever 
that might mean.  With respect to the organism, the message is 
not encoded in anyway, and speaking of a neural code is 
metaphorical and at times misleading.  The analogy has changed 
from information transfer to language translation.  Our goal here, 
however, is not to support other metaphors, but to show that 
Shannon’s communication model, which is an integral part of 
modern technology, does not match the relation between an ES 
and BR. 
     Neuroscientists, such as deCharms and Zador (2000), 
repeatedly claim that spike trains carry information or content 
about the environment, and suggest what it means ‘to carry 
information’: 
 
“Imagine recording from the neuron labeled B1 during 
different types of stimuli or behaviors and discovering the 
information that this neuron carries about the organism’s 
environment—the content of this neuron’s signal (p614-
15).” 
 
In a concrete example about a retinal cell they say that “The 
activity of the neuron will be highly correlated with the point of 
luminance (thus carrying content about this input)(p637).”  Like 
in Hubel-Wiesel’s ES/BR experiments,  we call this evidence the 
selective covariation between stimulus properties and spike 
trains.   deCharms and Zador use the word ‘information’ above to 
possibly mean ‘specific properties or features of the stimulus.’   
Given these examples, we can suppose that they would endorse 
the following argument: (1) spikes trains and stimulus properties 
selectively (and causally) covary, and (2) the (representational) 
content of a spike train is the stimulus property that causes that 
spike train. 
     deCharms and Zador do not bring forth any other types of 
experimental evidence other than selective covariation to justify 
the claim that spike trains carry informational or representational 
content, although they do stress that the representational nature 
of spikes trains is based upon content and function.  We have 
argued that (1) is a statement about the evidence that all of us 
would agree upon, but that (2) does not obviously follow.   The 
fact that an ES and BR selectively covary, through causal paths, 
does not appear sufficient to justify claims of representational 
content, and it has been argued that covariation of this sort is not 
even necessary for representational content (Millikan 1989, 
Bechtel 1998).  
     We need not expect deCharms and Zador, as neuroscientists, 
to philosophically justify what it means for a spike train to carry 
informational content, yet if claims of carrying content do not 
follow immediately from the observed evidence, then we can 
only assume that they are interpreting the evidence or 
communicating the evidence by way of metaphor.  But deCharms 
and Zador, along with many other neuroscientists, speak as 
though ‘carrying content’ is a straightforward experimental fact 
apart from, or in addition to, selective covariation. 
     From a philosophical perspective, Dretske (1988, 1995) 
argues that regular causal covariation, by itself, implies 
information carrying.  For example, he says that flag poles and 
metal paper clips carry information about temperature because 
the volumes of these metal objects are reliably correlated with 
temperature.  But is it not too easy to find this sort of information 
carrying all around us?  And why do the objects in question need 
to be regularly or reliably correlated?  Any two things that are 
causally related, perhaps probabilistically, transmit the same sort 
of thing.  If the flag pole was hit by a lightning bolt, does not the 
flag pole carry information about the energy of the lightning 
bolt?  
     So long as the causal relations are understood between objects 
c and e, then we might say that e carries information about c.  If a 
situation can be expressed in the form of a law-like equation, 
then any parameter on one side of the equation can be said to 
carry information about a parameter on the other side equation, 
such as the ideal gas law PV=nRT.  If the conditions are 
probabilistic, then we can use probability theory to derive the 
distribution of one variable given another, so long as we have 
some understanding of the physical connections between 
variables. Carrying information, at least according to Dretske, 
follows directly from knowing the causal relations between two 
physical situations, or from minimally knowing that two 
situations are statistically correlated.  If by processing 
information neuroscientists and philosophers mean that stimulus 
properties causally or statistically covary with regionally specific 
neuronal activity, then we agree with P, although we suggest 
abandoning P in favor of more empirically-grounded statements 
about covariation. 
 
3.2.2  Other Philosophical Justification of Information in 
ES/BR studies 
 
     Considering similar ES/BR experimental evidence, Garson 
(2003) has attempted to explain a concept of information based 
upon the pioneering electrophysiological ES/BR studies of Edgar 
Adrian.   Hubel-Wiesel’s and Adrian’s experiments were similar; 
both consisted of presenting stimuli while measuring the 
electrical responses of single cells.  Although the technologies, 
organisms, cell types, and stimulus types differed between 
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Hubel-Wiesel and Adrian’s experiments; the evidence in both 
consisted of the relations between stimuli and neuronal spike 
trains, and it is this evidence that Garson uses to elucidate a 
concept of information. 
     To ground his concept of information, Garson argues—in 
accordance with Adrian—that “differences in the frequency of 
the sequence of action potentials map onto the differences in the 
intensity of the stimulus that produce them, and not to a constant 
state of the stimulus.”  He argues that differences in stimuli and 
spike trains map to or covary with each other, and that this fact 
captures the sense in which spike trains and stimuli are 
arbitrarily related to each other, thus supporting the 
informational nature of the spike train. 
     Garson’s argument stands or falls with the truth of differential 
mapping, yet his belief in differential mapping, which he takes 
from Adrian’s work, does not correspond to the predominant 
experimental methodology used to acquire evidence in ES/BR 
studies.  Since Hubel-Wiesel’s experiments, neuronal responses 
in electrophysiological ES/BR studies are most often understood 
by characterizing the feature selectivity of the cell type (Rieke et 
al. , p12).  This selectively corresponds to the collection of 
stimulus properties that evoke responses for that cell, and 
highlights the properties that evoke optimal responses.  It is 
based upon the concept of selective response that we analyzed 
above.  Selectivity involves a non-differential mapping between 
stimuli and responses, it grounds our current understanding of 
sensory cell types, and directly opposes Garson’s concept of 
differential mapping. 
     But the fact that a scientific community makes use of feature 
selectivity rather than differential mapping to acquire evidence 
does not in itself deny differential mapping.   We, too, are 
questioning the community in its interpretations of evidence, 
although we are not challenging its methodology.  Garson argues 
that the differential mapping between stimuli and spike rates 
logically follows from a conjunction of the principle of neuronal 
rate coding with the principle of adaptation: 
 
“While the principle of rate coding entails that the 
frequency of the sequence of action potentials is an 
exponential function of the magnitude of the stimulus, the 
principle of adaptation entails that upon application of a 
constant stimulus, the frequency of the sequence of action 
potentials will diminish, and eventually such outputs will 
stop being produced. Hence the relation between the 
sequence and stimulus is differential.” 
 
No further derivation is given, which is concerning since each 
principle taken individually contradicts differential mapping in 
Garson’s sense.  Rate coding is a form of non-differential 
mapping:  a specific stimulus intensity directly maps onto a 
specific frequency of action potentials.  How can Garson assume 
non-differential mapping as a premise to establish differential 
mapping?  And the principle of adaptation is equally troubling; it 
implies that a negative change in the frequency of action 
potentials maps onto a constant intensity of the stimulus.  But 
this directly conflicts with Garson’s claim that differences in 
spike rates map onto differences in intensity, and “not to a 
constant state of the stimulus.”       
     We agree with Garson that differences in stimuli are 
particularly important to the human organism and other animals, 
but Garson does not logically establish differential mapping—
nor does the scientific evidence primarily support differential 
mapping—and thus he does reach the goal of deriving a concept 
of information from the evidence.  Even if he did establish 
differential mapping, the next step in the derivation, where he 
argues that the relation between stimuli and spike trains is 
arbitrary, meets with difficulties as we will show. 
     Garson provides an alternative way to understand the relation 
between stimuli and spike rates that does not directly depend 
upon the truth of differential mapping.   He explains that a given 
stimulus s1 may be associated with multiple firing rates r1 and r2 
because of adaptation, and that two stimuli s1 and s2 may be 
associated with a single firing rate r1 for similar reasons.  In his 
words: 
 
 “For example, suppose a stimulus of intensity si elicits a 
firing rate ri from a neuron. Then si is held constant, and by 
the principle of adaptation, the firing rate is reduced (say, to 
ri-1). Upon increasing the stimulus to si+1, the firing rate 
may return to ri, its initial value.” 
 
Garson is arguing that the relation between stimuli and firing 
rates is a many-to-many relation as opposed to a one-to-one 
relation or a one-to-many relation.  This sense of relation 
corresponds to the use of relation in relational databases.  For 
example, the relation between a person and that person’s driver’s 
license number is one-to-one; the relation between each continent 
and its countries is one-to-many—each continent can have 
multiple countries, but each country belongs to one continent; 
and the relation between academic articles and their authors is 
many-to-many—each article may have multiple authors, and 
each author may contribute to multiple articles. 
     Garson believes that the many-to-many relation between 
stimuli and spike rates supports a notion of arbitrariness, and that 
this arbitrariness, although not sufficient, is a necessary 
constituent of a concept of information.  But what is necessarily 
arbitrary about a many-to-many relation in contrast to a one-to-
one relation?  A one-to-one relation, such as the driver’s license 
example above, may be as arbitrary—or more arbitrary—than a 
many-to-many relation, depending upon how that relation came 
to be.  Garson attempts to distinguish between arbitrary and non-
arbitrary causal relations by contrasting two neurophysiological 
mechanisms involved in auditory perception:  the tympanic 
membrane and the hair cells of the inner ear.  He says that the 
relation between air pressure oscillations and the vibrations of 
the tympanic member is one-to-one, and is therefore non-
arbitrary; but that the hair cells of the inner ear undergo 
adaptation, which implies a many-to-many relation between air 
pressure oscillations and hair cell firing, and is therefore 
arbitrary.  Garson believes that relations that come to be through 
mechanisms of adaptation and are many-to-many are arbitrary, 
and those that do not involve adaptation and are one-to-one are 
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non-arbitrary.  But it seems obvious that one-to-one and many-
to-many relations may both be arbitrary or non-arbitrary.  The 
relevant difference that determines arbitrariness for Garson must 
be the presence of adaptive mechanisms, but he uses neuronal 
adaptation only as a means to justify the many-to-many relation 
between stimuli and responses.  In this sense the argument is 
circular. 
 
3.2.3  Summary of ES/BR Studies 
 
     Rigorous experimental neuroscience has demonstrated 
neurons that selectively respond to a wide range of measurable 
parameters across the five senses.  Because selective responses 
reliably covary with stimulus properties, we can use 
mathematical tools to predict stimulus properties given spike 
trains, and predict spike trains given stimulus properties.  The 
idea that there is a neural code, however, is a metaphor, since 
spike trains are not encoded with respect to the organism, 
anymore than English is encoded with respect to an English 
speaker.  Further, the idea that spikes trains carry information is 
grounded in the experimental evidence of selective covariations, 
but most commentators conflate or equate carrying information 
and selective covariation. 
 
3.3  T/BR 
 
     Task/brain-response studies combine aspects of S/A and 
ES/BR studies, and our critiques of these studies will apply.  In 
addition to systematically manipulating the external environment 
as in ES/BR studies, T/BR studies add to this manipulation a task 
for the subject to perform.  The task is similar to an ability in a 
S/A study, except that the task is a transient activity while an 
ability is an ongoing capacity to act in a particular way.   With 
regard to scientific research, tasks should have observable or 
measurable criteria for successful completion, while abilities 
should have observable or measurable criteria for possession of 
the ability.  We can often study a topic using either task or ability 
language.  For instance, in memory studies, we can assign 
subjects the task of memorizing a set or numbers, and then ask 
for those numbers at a later time.  The task of remembering and 
the ability to remember are similar in that the criteria for 
completion of the task and possession of the ability are 
equivalent.  If one remembers the numbers correctly, one has 
successfully completed the task and possesses the ability to 
remember.  
     Let us recall the Poppenk et al. (2010) T/BR study on 
prospective memory described above, where subjects were 
presented a series of visual scenes and instructed to either 
imagine performing an action associated with that visual scene 
(e.g. swinging on a swing when shown a swing), or to use the 
scene as a reminder to perform an action the next time the same 
scene was viewed.  FMRI was used to measure brain properties 
while the subjects performed these tasks.  After this task, the 
subjects were taken to a quite room to perform an identification 
test.  They were shown visual scenes on a computer and asked to 
indicate whether each scene was studied as an intention, an 
action, or not seen during scanning at all.  Researchers recorded 
correct and incorrect responses.  The results of the identification 
test were statistically correlated with the fMRI data to identify 
spatiotemporal fMRI activity patterns that predicted correct 
responses on the identification test.  Poppenk et al. speculated 
that some of the identified brain regions enact “processes 
associated with successful encoding of intentions (p911).” 
     This particular T/BR study is more complicated than the 
ES/BR studies of Hubel-Wiesel from an interpretational 
standpoint.  Although T/BR studies are not necessarily more 
complicated than ES/BR studies, the complexity of Poppenk et 
al.’s study is not atypical for fMRI studies that include cognitive 
tasks.  Like S/A and ES/BR studies described above, the 
empirical evidence in this T/BR study consists of selective 
correlations, in this case between successful task completion and 
properties of brain areas.  These selective correlations, like those 
described in S/A and ES/BR studies, do not logically imply that 
the function of the identified brain regions is to perform a 
process directly related to the task.  Poppenk et al. make no 
attempt to understand the so-called processes of the identified 
brain region other than to say that processes are associated with 
the task, but the observed form of this association is statistical 
correlation.  Even if this association was selectively causal, we 
still could not infer that the function of the brain region had to do 
with completing the task, for the causal association could be 
accidental.  And even if the function of the brain region involves 
processes to complete the task, we do not know that completing 
the task involves processing information of any kind.   
 
3.4  BM/BR 
  
     Brain-manipulation/behavioral response studies demonstrate 
the behavioral effects of causally manipulating brain properties.   
As an example, optogenetic studies are a relatively recent 
advance in BM/BR experimentation, and permit precise 
manipulation of neuronal activity. These experiments involve 
expressing light-sensitive genes within specific neurons or 
populations of neurons in living animals.  When the neurons with 
the expressed genes are exposed to light of a particular 
wavelength, the activity of the neuron will either increase or 
decrease, allowing for precise control of the neuron’s activity.  
Presumably the expressed genes do not significantly alter the 
functioning of the neuron otherwise.  For example, Wyart et al. 
(2009) expressed light sensitive genes within so-called Kolmer-
Agdur cells of the zebrafish, and then non-invasively 
manipulated the neuronal activity of these cells which modulated 
the swimming behavior of the animal. 
     BM/BR studies establish causal relationships between the 
activity of multiple brain areas or between brain area activity and 
behavioral responses.  Canonical examples of BM/BR 
experiments involve electrical stimulation of brain areas resulting 
in muscle movements.  These types of experiments can be traced 
back to at least Fritsch and Hitzig (1870) who applied surface 
electrodes to dog brain and demonstrated that the anatomical 
location of electrical stimulation selectively covaried with 
movements in different muscle groups.  Neuroscientists name the 
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structure of this covariation a somatotopic organization, and 
classically explain the relation between cerebral cortex and 
muscle movements with the following three hypotheses 
(Graziano et al. 2002): (1) the precentral gyrus, or primary motor 
cortex, contains an explicit topographic map of the body with the 
foot on the top of the cerebral hemisphere, the mouth on the 
bottom, and other parts systematically organized in between; (2) 
the activity at each point in the map specifies the tension in a 
small group of muscle fibers; and (3) cortical motor areas are 
organized in a clear hierarchy of control.  These classical 
hypotheses have been summarized as far back as 1938 by Fulton, 
although there is a significant body of subsequent evidence that 
is not compatible with the classical theory (Graziano et al. 2002). 
     Contemporay BM/BR studies of primate motor function 
typically involve inserting microelectrodes into the cerebral 
cortex of an awake animal, and injecting low electrical currents 
into the cellular network while simultaneously recording the 
pattern of muscle movements, allowing the researcher to catalog 
the causal relations between electrical stimulation and these 
movements.  One hopes or assumes that the patterns of muscle 
movements in response to exogenous stimulation are similar to 
those caused by endogenous neural activity, although the induced 
electrical activity is clearly non-physiologic, complicating any 
interpretation of the results. 
     If we consider the brain to be a mechanical mechanism, what 
do these motor BM/BR studies tell us about the brain?  In other 
words, knowing that anatomical locations of electrical 
stimulation and patterns of muscle movement covary with each 
other, what can we say about the processes or functions that 
occur in those brain areas?  We might say that there is a causal 
propagation of electrical activity, beginning from motor cortical 
areas through the central nervous system and to spinal motor 
nerves that enact patterns of muscle contracture.  If we 
electrically stimulate the brain in other areas, the electrical 
activity does not propagate to spinal motor nerves.  The motor 
cortex therefore acts as a metaphorical gateway or hub of 
electrical activity from CNS to spinal nerves, where the pathways 
are at least partially organized with respect to specific muscle 
movements.   
     Claims of motor information processing are not needed to 
describe these results, but presumably arise when one assumes 
that areas of the motor cortex naturally represent various muscle 
groups, or that the precentral gyrus contains a map of the body, 
but the fact that electrical activity propagates through specific 
pathways does not establish that motor areas naturally represent 
muscle groups.  Just as the idea of a neural code is a sometimes 
useful metaphor for communicating scientific results, the idea of 
a topographic map of the body in the precentral gyrus is a useful 
metaphor for summarizing the data about causal organization 
with respect to electrical stimulation. 
     Compare the structure of the patellar reflex in the peripheral 
nervous system: hitting the patellar tendon stretches the 
quadriceps muscle which activates sensory receptors that 
propagate electrical activity through motor neurons that contract 
the quadriceps.  We can describe the propagation of physical 
changes without any reference to information processing or 
transmission.  Of course, one can use a metaphorical information 
language to describe the propagation of electrical activity 
involving the patellar reflex, but this language adds nothing to 
our physical understanding of the reflex.  Electrical activity does 
not propagate randomly through the brain; its pathways are 
organized, and scientists attempt to understand this causal 
organization with respect to an organism’s abilities.  BM/BR 
studies are an important tool for understanding this organization, 
however, knowledge of causal organization does not imply 
knowledge of the processes that occur within a brain region, nor 
does it provide evidence of information processing. 
      
   
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
     Cognitive and neuroscientists have measured action 
potentials, ischemic lesions, distributions of dopamine receptors, 
electromagnetic surface potentials, and many other brain 
properties.  They have measured temporal sequences of brain 
properties contemporaneous with environmental stimuli and 
behavioral actions, and have manipulated brain tissue and 
catalogued behavioral changes.  It is clear that the activity of 
particular brain areas selectively covaries with specific stimulus 
properties and abilities.  However, since we cannot logically 
infer processes and functions given experimental correlations 
between stimuli or abilities and brain areas, it is difficult to 
justify Bechtel and Richardson’s supposed uncontroversial claim 
that “the brain contains some regions that are specialized for 
processing specific types of information.”  The brain does 
contain regions that selectively covary with particular stimulus 
properties and particular abilities, and we may at times attribute 
causality to these covariations, but interpretational claims that 
attribute information processing to brain areas go beyond the 
evidence.    
     We admit that our examination of the research is far from 
exhaustive, and that we have limited our analysis to relational 
evidence.  There are likely other categories of evidence that 
support information processing in the brain, but we feel we have 
examined evidence that is classically taken to support 
information processing and find it inadequate. 
      Rather than inferring solely from the experimental evidence 
as we have suggested, cognitive scientists typically begin with a 
priori theories about particular cognitive processes, and use the 
results of relational studies to choose between these theoretical 
cognitive processes (Henson 2006).  One might call the claim 
that the brain processes information one of these hypothetical 
cognitive theories.  We have not found empirical support for this 
cognitive theory, although others may interpret the evidence 
otherwise.  If one assumes that selective correlation or causation 
implies information carrying, then one will see information 
processing everywhere one looks.  In this sense, information 
processing is not a scientific theory or fact, but a basic principle 
or metaphor that many people find useful in communicating and 
interpreting evidence. 
     There is no doubt that mathematical modeling will help us to 
understand the functioning of the brain, but we have not 
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addressed modeling efforts in this work because modeling in 
cognitive science is underdetermined, and to our knowledge 
there are no cognitive models that are largely accepted as 
representing mental facts.  Further, while modeling may provide 
some evidence for information processing in the brain, this 
evidence is relatively weak because of the above and because 
information processing enters as an assumption of these models 
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